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Abstract  
Analysis of the Deepwater Horizon disaster and the accumulative decline of 
BP demonstrate both the analytical efficacy of the capital-as-power approach 
to value theory, and the irreducible role of objects in the process of 
accumulation. Rather than productivity per se, accumulation depends on (1) 
control of productivity, and (2) the evaluation of control. Capital-as-power 
focuses on capitalization as an expression of the evaluation by owners of their 
own power. In this article, I argue that the power of owners translated into 
capital values is power over both the human and non-human components of 
systems of production. Power is actualized through entities defined as cultural 
and political, as well as economic. Capitalization translates into the 
commensurable financial units of capital the irreducible social order—
including objects—that bears on accumulation. The decline of BP’s capital 
valuation in the wake of the disaster expressed the market’s falling confidence 
in the expertise, experience and equipment that comprised the company’s 
productive capacity. 
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Introduct ion 
The Macondo well was difficult, but not exceptional. Equipment 
aboard the drilling vessel was misbehaving, but that was not, in and of 
itself, unusual. Drilling a deep-water well is a complicated undertaking, 
involving hundreds of workers and hundreds of millions of dollars of 
equipment, billions if you include the satellites required to maintain 
the rig’s stationary position above the well. The workers are highly 
trained, highly skilled and well paid. Things can go wrong in an 
instance, but the workers know how to ensure the oil formation, the 
bedrock, the borehole, the drilling equipment and the vessel get along. 
Disobedience is expected, but when it occurs, it is swiftly contained 
thanks to an assemblage of documents, drills and devices (Law 1986). 
Unfortunately, the defiance of the Macondo well would exceed the 
expertise, experience and equipment of the drilling crew. 
The name of the well—Macondo—came from the ill-fated town of 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude. It now 
seems prescient because of what happened at 21.45 on April 20, 2010. 
Opening up the Macondo well was the Deepwater Horizon. The name 
of the vessel is now ubiquitous, invoking the deaths of 11 men, 
massive environmental degradation in the Gulf of Mexico and the near 
demise of BP, one of a handful of giant oil corporations. 
Among the outcomes of the Deepwater Horizon disaster was a 
massive decline in the market capitalization of BP, the majority owner 
of the Macondo well (Figure 1). This decline emerged from calculative 
translations by market participants. Buyers and sellers of BP’s shares 
observed and evaluated the qualitative events surrounding the disaster. 
That evaluation translated them into the quantities of finance. 
According to the capital-as-power theory of value (CasP), the decline 
of BP—assessed relative to the broader universe of corporations—
constitutes an evaluation of a loss of power by the company. The 
originators of CasP, Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2009), 
have defined power as “confidence in obedience” (17). That means a 
loss of power occurs with a reduction in confidence or an increase of 
disobedience. Evaluations get translated into the commensurable 
values of finance through capitalization, which is the defining 
“inscription device” (Latour 1987) of capitalism. Within the CasP 
framework, because those values are meaningful relative to other 
values, capitalists pursue differential accumulation. The concept will be 
described more fully below. However, for now it suffices to note that 
what capitalists seek is not simply a return on investment but a return 
on investment that outperforms the returns of the broad market. 
In this article, I argue that things have to be included in our 
understanding of obedience and, in the case of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster and the changing evaluation of BP by market participants, 
things were among the disobedient entities. This analysis offers an 
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affirmative response to Marion Fourcade’s (2011) call for a “full-
blown sociology of economic valuation,” contingent on a broad, 
transdisciplinary understanding of sociology. It seeks to bring together 
insights from capital-as-power about the meaning of the financial 
practices that comprise capital accumulation with insights from actor–
network theory (ANT) about the emergent qualities of human-thing 
assemblages. What is the relationship between the quantities and 
qualities of accumulation? In other words, what is the relationship 
between values and that which is evaluated? 
Things enlisted in the drilling of the Macondo well operated outside 
their expected behavior, both individually and collectively. This 
transgression triggered a cascade of emergent responses with a 
plethora of qualitative impacts, including the deaths of 11 men, the 
worst marine oil spill in history, widespread public outrage, numerous 
lawsuits and regulatory changes. These complex, irreducible events 
were evaluated by market participants giving them quantitative sense.  
As long as political economy defines value in terms of human labor 
or human desire it accedes to the bifurcation of humans and things 
that many sociologists, particularly in science and technology studies 
(STS), have argued against (Miller 1997; Latour 2005; Slater and 
Barry 2005; Pinch 2008; Swedberg and Pinch 2008). Conversely, 
Nitzan and Bichler’s analytical method transcends the bifurcation as it 
assumes ongoing evaluation of human-thing assemblages that bear on 
the fortunes of capitalized entities. The practices of price construction 
attempt to account for anything that might affect expected earnings 
with no differentiation between “social” or “natural” causes.  
The role of things in the formation and functioning of society was a 
motivating concern of STS (Callon and Latour 1981; Knorr-Cetina 
1981; Latour and Woolgar 1985; Woolgar 1985; Callon 1986; Law 
1986; Latour 1987). This has influenced a line of research examining 
how things shape finance (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger 2000, 2002; 
MacKenzie 2006, 2008; Muniesa 2008; Preda 2008). Description and 
analysis of valuation processes has been one tangent of that research 
(Fourcade 2011; Muniesa 2011; Muniesa et al. 2017). With my 
analysis of the Deepwater Horizon disaster and the accumulatory 
decline of BP, I intend to demonstrate both the analytical efficacy of 
the CasP approach to value theory, as well as the irreducible role of 
things in the process of accumulation. 
In the founding editorial of Valuation Studies, Claes-Fredrik 
Helgesson and Fabian Muniesa (2013) confront the question of 
objectivity. Sociologists have almost universally—and rightly—rejected 
the objectivity of capital values, in the sense that these values do not 
express some underlying reality. However, Helgesson and Muniesa, 
following Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (2010), note that what 
matters is the process of objectification, which “makes valuation solid 
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or weak, meaningful or flawed, useful or useless in particular 
situations” (7). Capitalization is the defining valuation process of 
capitalism. The values it produces are obsessively monitored by market 
participants, who judge the specific values produced as “solid or weak, 
meaningful or flawed, useful or useless” through subsequent buying 
and selling that produces a new set of capital values. CasP theorizes 
these values to be to an objectified expression of the relative power of 
capitalists, as evaluated by capitalists. I am applying this insight to 
create a map of power redistribution. The map does not explain that 
power. Instead, it shows power shifts to then be explained. To my 
knowledge, this is a unique conjunction and application of CasP, ANT 
and the work found within Valuation Studies. 
What Do Capital Values Mean? 
Capitalization is ostensibly a straightforward calculation that 
discounts expected future returns to establish the present value of an 
asset. However, as Muniesa et al. note, “capitalization has certainly to 
do with finance proper, but it is also more than that” (2017: 11, 
emphasis in original). 
Muniesa et al. examine the ways that capitalization operates across 
and beyond the domain of finance. This needs to be situated in relation 
to capitalization as a process of finance proper, where it is also more 
than its ostensible operation. In particular, consideration should be 
given to the ways that capital values are subsequently evaluated as part 
of the ongoing process of price formation. There will be various 
timelines for the use of capital values in subsequent calculations. High-
frequency algorithmic trading will immediately translate changing 
values into trading decisions. Conversely, market participants in the 
Warren Buffet mode of “value investing” will try to assess whether 
stocks are undervalued relative to their “fundamentals.” None of this 
processing occurs purely in the minds of capitalists. Rather, financial 
values are both input and output of the distributed cognition of capital 
markets. Study that engages with the values created and the processes 
of creation can help us understand better the meaning of capital values 
to capitalists. 
Capitalization 
Nitzan and Bichler (2009) theorize that capitalization folds the diverse 
institutions and processes that bear on earnings and volatility into 
capital. Capitalization is an obligatory passage point for capitalist 
metrology. Its meaning and practices get carried outside finance 
(Muniesa et al. 2017). These extra-financial operations subsequently 
inform measurements folded back into capital values via the 
calculative practices within finance.  
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Fabian Muniesa (2011) writes, “Valuation is about considering a 
reality while provoking it” (32). In the case of capitalization, the 
purpose of provocation is accumulation. Provocation is always an 
indeterminate process because (a) different accumulatory undertakings 
will seek different social transformation; and (b) the objects of 
intervention do not behave deterministically. Nitzan and Bichler 
(2009), drawing on Cornelius Castoriadis, have emphasized the 
potential disobedience of the populations subject to capitalist 
creordering—the creation of order. I argue, drawing on ANT, that 
things must also be considered potential sites of unruly behavior that 
defy intervention and, therefore, calculation. Conjoining the language 
of ANT with CasP confirms: the disobedience of things announces 
their status as mediators. Capitalization treats obedient things as 
intermediaries. For example, the capitalization of BP would consider, 
among much else, the productivity of the company’s drilling 
operations, of which blowout preventers (BoPs) are a vital part. The 
Deepwater Horizon’s BoP did not perform according to the 
expectations of either the operators of the drilling rig or the capitalists 
invested in BP. Blowout preventers are actants with an affective role in 
the extraction of oil, and therefore, the profitability of oil companies.  
The drastic decline in the capital values of BP—and other firms—as 
the disaster unfolded is perhaps unsurprising. There was little doubt 
that BP’s future included fines and lawsuits. As the disaster grew from 
an explosion on a drilling rig to an undersea oil leak of unprecedented 
proportions, the company’s very existence was called into question. In 
that context, it is obvious that shareholders would seek to unload the 
company’s shares. To do so, the shares had to be offered at ever lower 
prices to attract buyers. In the course of making these trades, market 
participants constructed a price. In assigning meaning to these prices 
both mainstream and critical political economy excluded the 
construction process. The meaning of these prices is narrowly 
conceived in terms of productivity. Yet, only a small portion of the 
decline in BP’s valuations could be assigned to the disaster’s effects on 
either company’s productive capacity or output. According to the most 
widely used theories of economic value, the rest of the decline must be 
deemed “non-economic.”  
Irreduction 
CasP makes the price-constructing process central to the meaning of 
capital values. Rather than a representation of underlying productive 
capacity, capital values express an evaluation by market participants of 
a capitalized entity’s social power, of which productive entities are only 
a part. Government policies, consumer trends, technological changes 
and big weather events, among many other agents, can all be assessed 
and translated into the prices of capital. As such, there is no 
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“economic” and “non-economic” distinction to be made. Adopting 
Bruno Latour’s conception of irreduction (Latour 1993a), I argue that 
financial values become the measure of the irreducible entities that 
comprise owners’ matters of concern. 
Latour introduces his conception of irreduction in a small work of 
aphorisms, published in English as the second half of The 
Pasteurization of France (1993b). The very first aphorism (1.1.1) reads, 
“Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything 
else” (158). Aphorism 1.2.2 adds that “nothing is, in and of itself, 
either commensurable or incommensurable” (163). Applied to value 
theory, this means that the value of an asset cannot be ontologically 
reduced to production, productivity or anything else. Rather, “[w]hat is 
ne i ther reduc ib le nor i r reduc ib le [ commensurable nor 
incommensurable] has to be tested, counted, and measured. There is 
no other way” (158). Measures perform an epistemological reduction 
and commensuration that is added to the world. Capital is the 
universalizing mechanism that allows owners to commensurate their 
control over the broad social order. 
Productivity 
The removal of productivity from the core of capital valuation is not a 
removal of productive entities from our understanding of value. 
However, their role in valuation needs to be reconceptualized and 
resituated. Things exude “unintended consequences” and necessarily 
exceed “dead labour” or marginal productivity. The construction of 
capital values is a translation of information about the complex, 
enfolded social order. That translation takes place along myriad 
intersecting metrological chains (Latour and Lepinay 2010). Systems 
of production, such as oil rigs, exist within “resource environments” 
that comprise “the complex arrangements of physical stuff, extractive 
infrastructures, calculative devices, discourses of the market and 
development, the nation and the corporation, everyday practices, and 
so on” (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014: 7) that allow for 
production itself. The processes of financial valuation are entangled 
within these complex arrangements. But those valuation processes add 
a reduction into the complex arrangements in the form of financial 
values. Valuation takes into account much more than productivity, not 
least because productivity is not independent of the prices that emerge 
from financial valuations.  
According to productivist value theory, increased oil rig efficiency—
improving their potential output per unit of input—ought to increase 
their value. However, increasing the output of oil can reduce its price, 
lowering the value of the increasingly productive oil rigs. Therefore, oil 
output needs to be carefully controlled to bolster profitability (Nitzan 
and Bichler 1995, 2002; Mitchell 2011). 
[Disobedient Things] 9 
It is control of productivity, termed “sabotage” by early twentieth-
century political economist Thorstein Veblen (1921), rather than 
productivity per se, that is the mechanism of accumulation. Hence, 
Nitzan and Bichler’s claim that capital is power. My argument is that 
capitalist control is contingent not only on the human components of 
productive entities but also on the things involved in the process of 
production. Things are part of the domain of evaluation and their 
“obedience” is quantified into financial values. Productivity is an 
emergent quality of the worker–object assemblages that comprise 
productive entities. It cannot be ontologically reduced to human and 
non-human component parts. In other words, it is irreducible. When 
the valuation process constructs a price for an assemblage of 
production it does so on the basis of an assemblage’s overall 
productivity, putting most of the worker-objects involved into a “black 
box” (Latour 1987). However, when a crisis emerges, as in the case of 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the black boxes will be opened, and 
market participants will peer inside to evaluate particular impacts on 
expected profits and perceived risks. Both humans and non-humans 
will be subject to this evaluation.  
Evaluation 
Importantly, the evaluations performed do not necessarily agree. 
Indeed, they are guaranteed not to. As will be seen below, although the 
capitalization of BP declined precipitously, the process was a fitful one, 
as sellers of shares were finding buyers. Both buyers and sellers are 
heavily equipped with economic technologies in the form of computing 
power, databases, algorithms, calculative techniques and much more 
(MacKenzie 2008). Among the buyers and sellers there are both widely 
shared and highly guarded technologies as they seek evaluative 
advantages that will translate into differential gain.  
Fourcade (2011) notes that “the mere availability of certain 
economic technologies does not guarantee their performative 
effect” (1724). She said that these objects may lack institutional, 
political or cultural resonance. However, there is another factor in the 
murky performance of economic models within the calculative 
practices of capitalization. These technologies must be implemented by 
market participants pursuing a differential advantage. They will deploy 
myriad other techniques, often deemed intuition or genius. These 
differentiating practices are slavishly analyzed after the fact by the 
business press both when financial figures experience extended periods 
of beating the market, but also when those figures appear to lose their 
godlike market-beating ability. 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Power 
Power, as deployed in the CasP approach, does not explain constructed 
prices. Rather, conceiving of capital values as the market’s evaluation 
of capitalists’ power enables analytical insights in need of explanation. 
As such, CasP should be considered an analytical method rather than 
an explanatory framework. It highlights that which needs to be 
explained. So conceived, we bring into the analysis of business 
activities Foucault’s insistence that the “mechanics of power” should 
be analyzed in “its specificity, its techniques and tactics” (Foucault 
1980: 116). What the CasP framework adds to this perspective is 
recognition that the possessors of power are also evaluating their 
power. The assessment informs subsequent activities to maintain and 
expand that power. We can learn much about power by studying the 
mechanism by which the powerful assess their own power. It allows us 
to move beyond the common, widespread recognition of social 
asymmetry to identifying the topological shifts in that asymmetry. 
With the asymmetries identified, we can begin to answer the question: 
“where do they come from and what are they made out of?” (Latour 
2005: 64). I argue that the decline of BP expressed the market’s falling 
confidence in the obedience of the entities that bear on its profits, 
including the things that comprise its productive capacity.  
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Key: t = April 20, 2010, the day of the accident. 
Source: Centre for Research in Security Prices. Series calculated by author. Note: 
Data points are indexed differential market capitalization (relative to S&P500; April 
20, 2010=100).  
The Quanti t ies and Quali t ies of Disaster 
Although placing a financial value on human life is widely considered 
crude and ethically objectionable, it is common (Zelizer 2010). For 
example, the fund established for the families of victims of 9/11 had 
three measures to establish payments: (1) financial loss; (2) set 
amounts for pain and suffering; (3) subtraction of life insurance paid. 
The first metric meant the lives of well-paid victims were valued more 
highly than those of poorly-paid victims. The high profile of the 
differential among payments provoked outrage, contravening moral 
sensibilities, but the act of valuing lives was accepted as a necessity of 
our thoroughly monetized society (Fourcade and Healy 2017). The 
extent of quantification facilitates capitalization. 
Calculating Financial Quantities 
Eleven men lost their lives in the Deepwater Horizon disaster.  Within 1
moments of the disaster, calculations were being made, including 
expected liabilities for the lives of these men. In addition to this 
computation, calculations would have been made about the probable 
distribution of liability, since the rig was being operated by the oil 
services company Transocean on behalf of BP. At the time of the 
explosion none of the markets listing BP’s shares—New York, London 
and Frankfurt—was open. Nonetheless, market participants would 
have been speculating on the possible costs to the company and the 
reaction of their fellow participants. These costs would reduce 
expected earnings and could increase the risk to earnings.  
At this stage, it is worth noting that the actual decision making 
involved in the evaluation process of market participants is incredibly 
opaque. First, social scientific attention to these activities is relatively 
new (Cetina and Preda 2004; MacKenzie 2008; Muniesa 2008; Preda 
2009; Lepinay 2011). Second, and more importantly, with profits on 
the line, market participants are reluctant to share their time or 
knowledge. I will not try to interpret the intentions of market 
participants but rather focus on actual market outcomes—the price 
fluctuation and trading volume of BP shares—and interpret those 
 Jason Anderson, Aaron (Dale) Burkeen, Donald Clark, Stephen Curtis, Gordon 1
Jones, Roy (Wyatt) Kemp, Karl Kleppinger, Keith Blair Manuel, Dewey Revette, 
Shane Roshto and Adam Weise. 
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outcomes from the analytical perspective of capital-as-power that the 
goal of all market participants is differential accumulation. 
Undoubtedly, interviews with market participants that bought and sold 
BP shares in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, as well as 
documents created by them at the time would illuminate how the 
objects of evaluation became financial values. Unfortunately, gathering 
such knowledge is beyond this article. 
In the early stages of the disaster, the scope was not well 
understood. There had been a blowout, the drilling rig was on fire and 
the deaths were reported with uncertainty. The continued fury of the 
flames indicated the BoP had failed. However, no one could know that 
the rig’s eventual sinking would result in an uncontrolled spill that 
would last months. Early uncertainty meant calculations had very little 
effect on the valuation of BP. Any single event can be difficult to 
discern in the movements of a large transnational corporation, since 
the translations are accounting for ongoing processes and events 
around the world. One disaster on one drilling rig—as horrific as it 
was—is a minor event relative to BP’s global operations. The volume 
of trading of BP shares would not reach an unusual level until April 
26, the Monday following the disaster, despite the fact that the vessel 
sank on April 22 and the leak was announced on April 24. In the first 
four days after the disaster, the value of BP shares declined 5 percent 
relative to the S&P 500 (Figure 1). As per the capital-as-power 
analytical standpoint on accumulation as a differential process of 
redistribution, all descriptions of capital values are relative to the S&P 
500, which serves capitalists—and CasP analysis—as a benchmark for 
“capital in general.” This perspective will be described in more detail 
below. 
The initial increase in trading activity saw daily volumes double 
relative to average 2009 volumes. Of course, not everyone was bidding 
the value down, since each seller required a buyer. In fact, the divergent 
assessments of the event are evidenced by the large spread of daily 
high-low trading values relative to the closing price. By the end of the 
trading day on April 28, the value of BP had actually recovered 1 
percent of its pre-disaster value. Those who expected the value of BP 
to recover outbid those who expected it to decline further. That 
changed on April 29. BP opened down 1.5 percent from its close the 
night before, and then lost another 6 percent. Although this decline is 
modest compared to the eventual loss BP’s valuation would take, 
market activity increased markedly at 13 times the company’s usual 
trading volumes. Just over a week after the explosion, and a week after 
the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, the divergent calculations of 
market participants rendered extreme price volatility. Over the next 
week the company’s market capitalization would fluctuate wildly 
between 7 and 22 percent below its pre-disaster value. During that 
week, BP’s daily high-low spread averaged 6 percent of its closing 
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price, compared to a 3.6 percent spread for the S&P 500, expressing 
the efforts of market participants to calculate the future of an ongoing, 
indeterminate event.  
This volatility moved around a precipitous, but not continuous, 
decline. On May 3, BP was 17 percent below its relative pre-disaster 
value, while the S&P 500 had changed by less than 1 percent. By June 
1, BP had lost 32 percent of its relative value, shedding 13 percentage 
points over the prior weekend. Its most volatile day would be June 9, 
with trading volumes 37 times greater than usual, an 18 percent 
spread between the day’s high and low, and the largest one-day decline 
in closing value of 15 percent. The bottom would come two weeks 
later, on June 25, when BP’s market capitalization would be just over 
half its pre-disaster value. The trading volume and high-low spread for 
that day were greatly reduced from the high volatility two weeks 
earlier. There was a much tighter consensus among market participants 
about where the price of BP ought to go.  
Over the next 20 days, the company would recover about 20 
percent of its relative pre-disaster value, effectively returning to the 
value established on June 1.  
Key: t = April 20, 2010, the day of the accident. 
Source: Centre for Research in Security Prices. Series calculated by author. 
Note: Data points are indexed differential market capitalization (relative to S&P500; 
April 20, 2010=100). 
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BP’s capitalization fluctuated around this relative value for over a 
year and a half. It would take until the end of August for both trading 
volumes and daily price spreads to return to relatively stable levels.  
BP was not the only corporation whose capitalization was 
negatively affected by the disaster. Drilling platform operator 
Transocean (RIG), as well as Halliburton (HAL), which manufactured 
and poured cement used in the well, and Cameron International 
(CAM), the manufacturer of the Deepwater Horizon, all saw sharp 
relative declines in the first weeks of the disaster (Figure 2). RIG, in 
particular, saw substantial, lasting losses. Notably, the significant 
points for these three firms do not perfectly align with those of BP as 
different calculations had to be made to account for the effects of the 
unfolding event on the various companies.  
 Importantly for my account, other members of the oil and oil 
services industries also had relative declines, particularly those active 
in the Gulf. Figure 1 includes a series for the broader oil business and 
one narrowed down to companies in the oil industry significantly 
affected by the U.S. moratorium on deep-water exploration in the Gulf 
of Mexico, enacted on May 30, 2010 . After a brief increase relative to 2
the S&P 500, both categories of companies saw a marked decline. 
Both saw their nadir on June 1, the first trading day after the U.S. 
Government announced the drilling moratorium. The non-BP oil 
business would return to its relative pre-disaster value by June 10. 
Market participants seemingly anticipated that any effects of the 
disaster on oil business profits would not extend to the entire field of 
companies. Unsurprisingly, companies affected by the moratorium 
would continue to feel the calculative effects of the disaster into 
October 2010, when the ban was lifted on deep-water drilling in the 
Gulf. 
All of this quantitative movement emerged from hundreds of 
millions of trades involving an unknown number of owners, asset 
managers and traders mobilizing hundreds of billions of dollars. This 
quantitative flux took place alongside, and in contact with, the 
qualitative events of the unfolding disaster and BP’s efforts along with 
the U.S. Government to stop the leak and respond to the spreading oil.  
A Disaster’s Qualities 
The explosion on the Deepwater Horizon occurred when a “kick” in 
the Macondo well allowed hydrocarbons to enter the riser that 
 “Oil Business” includes companies, other than BP, that satisfied the following 2
conditions: (1) classified under SIC13: Oil & Gas Extraction, SIC291: Petroleum 
Refining, SIC3533: Oil & Gas Field Machinery & Equipment, SIC46: Pipelines, 
except Natural Gas, SIC517: Petroleum & Petroleum Products; (2) valued at US$1 
billion or more on April 20, 2010; (3) had data for every day included in the chart. 
“Moratorium” is companies in “Oil Business” that saw a decline of 5 percent or 
more on June 1. 
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stretched between the drilling rig and the wellhead sitting on the floor 
of the Gulf.  Once the hydrocarbons reached the drilling rig, they 3
spread to the engine room and were ignited. The fire was fed by the 
hydrocarbons that continued to flow from the riser. At this point, the 
automated dead man’s mechanism on the BoP should have been 
triggered, clamping the well shut, stopping the flow of hydrocarbons 
and making it easier to extinguish the flames. However, for reasons 
that were unclear at that point—and long debated in the courts 
afterward—this did not happen. Once the Deepwater Horizon lost 
power, the dynamic positioning system that kept the rig in place above 
the wellhead stopped operating. With the vessel adrift, the riser 
stretched and buckled, likely initiating the leak. When the rig sank, the 
riser collapsed, resulting in a number of leaks along its bent, twisted 
length. 
Over the next two and a half months, the well uncontrollably 
gushed millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. Initially, there 
was a great deal of uncertainty about the scale of the leak. Partially, 
this was because the hydrocarbons were flowing out of several fissures 
in the collapsed riser. The first estimated flow rate was 1,000 barrels a 
day (b/d). On April 29, this was increased to as much as 5,000 b/d. By 
June 19, the Flow Rate Technical Group, which was organized for the 
sole purpose of providing an estimate, suggested the oil was flowing at 
35,000 to 60,000 b/d. The final estimate that would establish the total 
size of spill, was an average of 53,000 b/d, with an initial flow of 
62,000 b/d that dropped off as the reservoir was depleted and its 
pressure lessened.  
BP undertook several failed efforts to capture the oil and stop the 
leak. The first response was the use of a remote operated underwater 
vehicle to trigger the BoP. However, the BoP did not respond. Next, BP 
attempted to place a custom-made containment dome over the leak, 
with a spigot on top through which the hydrocarbons were to be 
diverted and captured. This failed when the hydrocarbons coming into 
contact with the dome crystallized, blocking the spigot and causing oil 
and gas to spill out the bottom. We might say that the hydrocarbons 
refused to obey the material order imposed by the containment dome. 
When that disobedience was publicly announced on May 10, BP’s 
relative value fell by almost 5 percent. That decline undid most of a 7 
percent increase in the days leading up to the lowering of the 
containment dome. Had the crystallization not occurred and the oil 
been successfully captured, BP’s quantitative decline would almost 
 The information in the qualitative description of the disaster is taken from several 3
reports on the event and its aftermath as well as news reports. These include BP’s 
investigative report (BP 2010) and the President’s Report from the U.S. National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011).
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certainly have been much less. On that day, disobedient hydrocarbons 
cost BP over a quarter billion dollars. 
The company also tried a “top kill,” which involved pumping heavy 
drilling mud into the well in an effort to staunch the flow of oil and 
gas, after which cement would be pumped to seal the well. A last-ditch 
effort as part of the top kill was the “junk shot,” which involved 
sending small pieces of rubber into the well to plug it up. These failed, 
in part because BP was reluctant to ramp up the pressure due to 
concerns about how obedient the surrounding rock could be. Although 
the engineers and other officials involved were confident the rock 
would obey an order translated into a certain magnitude of pressure, 
there was concern it might defy an order accompanied by higher 
pressures. If the rock formation cracked, then hydrocarbons could 
escape from multiple, widely distributed places on the seabed. Such 
leaks could not be contained, and it is possible BP’s liability would 
have bankrupted the company entirely. The decision was made not to 
risk the indeterminate disobedience that could bring with it an 
accumulatory death sentence. 
BP was able to seal the well on July 15 (Figure 1; fifth marker) with 
a custom-made cap that attached tightly to the BoP. While short-term 
closure efforts were being made, BP was also drilling two relief wells 
that intersected with the original well. Drilling mud and cement were 
pumped into these relief wells to permanently seal up the leaking well. 
On September 19, the well was declared “effectively dead.”  
As the leak was occurring, BP made efforts to collect some of the 
hydrocarbons spewing from the well. At most, the company was able 
to recover half of the flow. To deal with the oil on the surface of the 
Gulf, the company used chemical dispersants. Dispersant breaks up the 
oil, causing it to sink below the surface. Critics have speculated that 
this was not the best environmental course of action, but undertaken 
as a public relations effort, since it would eliminate the oil from view. 
Although there are no clear traces of how these efforts translated into 
the company’s capitalization, market participants were watching. 
Success or failure would be assessed and translated into decisions to 
bid share prices up and down.  
Pr ices and the evaluation of quali t ies 
Although it is taken for granted that a relationship exists between 
quantitative movements of equity prices and qualitative events, the 
actualities of that relationship are unclear. The purpose of the trades 
that moved BP and other corporations’ capitalization is largely beyond 
dispute: accumulation. However, the process of price construction is an 
opaque one, in part because on the one hand, mainstream political 
economic theory has conceived of stock markets as perhaps the 
ultimate example of the invisible hand, where supply and demand 
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converge to realize a fair and rational price. The reigning theory of 
stock market behavior is Eugene Fama’s “efficient market 
hypothesis” (Fama 1970), which contends that securities prices 
emerging from new information are optimal.  Most critical political 4
economy, on the other hand, has focused on the “real” economy, 
conceptualizing financial markets as a realm of fictional 
representations and dangerous speculative behavior. Financialization 
has emerged as a critical concept, in part, as a result of the long-
standing productivist bias of critical political economy.  
The sociology of finance emerged in recognition of the importance 
of finance as a social institution (Cetina and Preda 2004). A 
foundational theorist for the sociology of finance was Michel Callon, 
who also produced one of the original works of actor–network theory 
(Callon 1986). The Callon edited The Laws of the Market (1998b), 
along with Do Economists Make Markets? (MacKenzie et al. 2007), 
edited by Donald Mackenzie, Fabian Muniesa and Lucia Siu, are key 
texts in the “performativity” approach to the sociology of finance. 
Economists, equipped with the knowledges, technologies and materials 
of their trade, are centered in the analysis as actants informing, 
shaping and creating financial markets.  
The sociology of finance research is concerned with the processes of 
price formation. This analysis has focused on the subjects, objects and 
relations that constitute markets as networks of connected localities 
with prices as their output. For example, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Urs 
Bruegger’s (2002) analysis of the “global social system” in currency 
markets looked at patterns of behaviors among currency traders. The 
pair connected the behavior to the steady stream of currency values as 
the output of the financial processes. However, no attempt was made 
to assess what those values mean or what they do.  
In a recent survey of the sociology of markets, Neil Fligstein and 
Ryan Calder (2015) identified institutions and objects that support 
market activity, including financial markets. They did not include the 
important feedback process by which the outputs of financial markets 
shape those very markets. Fligstein and Calder note that a critique of 
the performativity thesis in the sociology of finance is that “financial 
markets, once constructed, take on a logic of their own” (11). Capital-
as-power argues that capital values, assessed in differential relation to 
a benchmark, are the mechanism of that logic.  
As complex as stock markets are, they generate perhaps the simplest 
of all entities: a single number. For most stocks that number 
continually changes but remains a single number. When the markets 
close on any given day, a value has been assigned to every stock traded, 
 See Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 192–196) for more critical insight on the efficient 4
market hypothesis. 
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which makes for a price on each corporation. Yet, each of those 
corporations is comprised of an incredible array of seemingly 
incommensurable entities. How does one price BP when it consists of a 
head office in London, staffed by technical experts, accounting clerks, 
human resources personnel, office administrators, and executives? To 
that are conjoined hundreds of wells and service stations around the 
world. The company subcontracts much of the actual drilling work 
and leases its name to franchisees operating service stations. It has 
proven oil reserves, refinery capacity and marketing campaigns. BP 
engages in R&D that generates technologies and alters the practices of 
oil exploration, extraction and refinery. BP also lobbies governments 
that pass laws concerning resource extraction, environmental 
protection and worker safety that will affect the profitability of the 
company’s operations. Despite the globe-spanning array of entities 
comprising BP, just a small swath of which are described here, at the 
end of each day, BP bears a single value.  
The magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon disaster actually allows 
us to connect specific events to drastic price movements of one of the 
largest corporations in the world. We know that speculation about the 
size of the oil spill would have been of great interest to market 
participations, since it would be used in the calculation of a fine to be 
levied on BP. If government spokespeople had said that the spill was 
much smaller than initially estimated, the price of BP would have risen. 
That rise would not just happen as a necessary, rational outcome. 
Rather, market participants would bid the price up. When, instead, the 
flow of the leak was continually ratcheted up, the value of BP 
continued to fall, pushed down by the recalculations of market 
participants. 
When the “top kill” failed on Saturday, May 29, and the Gulf 
drilling moratorium was announced on May 30, BP’s share opened on 
Monday, June 1 down 13 percent from their Friday close. Whatever 
else might have been happening in the sphere of BP’s operations was 
dwarfed by the failure of this high-profile effort and the U.S. 
Government’s actions. Traders mobilized shares at 19 times their usual 
volume, although price movements were only at three times the usual 
high-low spread. Yet, how these calculations were actually made is 
unknown. We can connect the capping of the well on July 15 with 12 
times the usual trading volume, four times the usual high-low spread 
and the return of almost 5 percent of BP’s pre-disaster value. However, 
how market participants arrived at this value is unknown. What is 
needed is a retheorization of capital and accumulation that accounts 
for the pricing process itself. My contention is that pricing accounts 
for both things and humans as consequential mediators. 
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Retheor izing Capital and Accumulat ion 
The accumulation of capital is widely understood to mean an increase 
in productive capacity. These gains are measured in nominal financial 
quantities which, according to both Marxist and neoclassical political 
economy, constitute a distorted representation of the real, underlying 
value of capital. Problems with this productivist conception of capital 
and accumulation, both analytical and theoretical, have long been 
identified and they were once the subject of heated theoretical debates 
(see Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 67–124 for a summary of these 
criticisms).  Unfortunately, the response to the problems has been 5
eschewal by political economists of critical engagement with the 
concepts, despite their key role in all political economic frameworks.  
The fundamental theoretical criticism of the standard conception of 
capital is an ontological one. It requires that “real” capital, i.e. 
productive capacity, has underlying quanta that make commensurable 
qualitative diversity. In other words, a vineyard, a tannery, a missile 
factory, a wind turbine, and all the rest of the heterogeneous material 
complexity of our systems of production have something within them 
that can be agglomerated in the process of accumulation. This is true 
of both Marxist and mainstream theories of capital. We can think of 
the standard theoretical conception as a “dual quantity” approach: 
observable quantities represent unobservable quantities, bypassing 
qualities. Much analytical energy has gone into converting nominal 
quantities into these postulated real quantities (see for example Shaikh 
and Tonak 1994). Now, however, that laudable project has been 
largely abandoned and most critical political economists simply use the 
problematic national accounting statistical calculations of “real” 
quantities, exemplified by real GDP (Stiglitz et al. 2009).  
The CasP theory of value revisits the concepts of capital and 
accumulation and reconceptualizes them without the real–nominal 
dichotomy. Rather, observable financial quantities, the ones that 
capitalists construct and engage with every day, and which have earned 
a prominent place in western media, both in the daily coverage of 
changes in stock market indices, and reporting on notable financial 
events, are treated as consequential in their own right. In other words, 
financial quantities are irreducible. The calculations are added into the 
world. They are rendered objects through a process of objectification 
and have affect. Although CasP gives these values a representative 
function, that representation is not merely reflective of an objective 
 The Cambridge capital controversy, involving economists at MIT facing off against 5
economists at Cambridge University, was the most high-profile debate about the 
nature of capital. Among the combatants were Paul Samuelson, who defended the 
neoclassical conception, and Joan Robinson, who poked substantial holes in the 
concept. See Cohen and Harcourt (2003); Hodgson (1997) for a history of the 
controversy.
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reality. Rather, the representation is poetic in the sense given by Elie 
Ayache (2010): the buying and selling of traders brings forth a price. 
Those prices become actants added to the world that have 
consequences overlooked by productivist political economy.  
Within CasP, the capitalization formula is the ultimate translational 
mechanism of capital. The basic calculation of capitalization is: 
where k is the present value of capital, πe is expected profits, β is a risk 
coefficient, r is the normal rate of return. The calculated value 
discounts expected profits by the uncertainty of those profits, and the 
expected returns from a safe asset, such as U.S. T-bills. This value can 
be calculated for a machine, a factory or an entire corporation. 
Capitalization is used by banks when they offer credit, by hedge funds 
when they identify a takeover target, by manufacturers when deciding 
whether to repair or replace a piece of machinery. The calculative 
mechanism for publicly traded corporations is the buying and selling 
of shares. Regardless of the complexity of an asset, whether a painting 
or an entire corporation, capitalization makes it possible to assign a 
single value.  
One of the most important insights of CasP is that the value of 
capital is forward looking. Marx conceptualized the value of capital as 
the “dead labour” included within it. Therefore, within the labor 
theory of value, the price of a piece of machinery represents the 
previous labor expended in its manufacture. Capitalization, however, is 
calculated using the expected future stream of earnings. It is the future, 
not the past that is expressed in the value of capital. Or, rather, it is the 
capitalists’ vision of the future, translated into the quantities of 
finance. This means that the capitalist vision of the world can be 
found, in part, by understanding the calculative process of value 
construction. 
The qualities being accounted for in the calculations of value are 
much broader and more diverse than just the labor involved, although 
labor is undeniably important. Anything and everything that market 
participants understand to affect future profits will be translated by the 
calculation of capital values. Government policies, consumer trends, 
resource access, protest movements, community norms, product hype 
and much more will be taken into account—literally. This fact is one 
that “everyone knows.” However, it is an uneasy reality at odds with 
standard political economy, not least because it obliterates the 
divisions between the economy and the other segments of the social 
order. Production cannot be isolated as a privileged domain 
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functioning free of these relationships. Both production and pricing are 
affected by non-economic processes since engineers and traders alike 
take account of these relationships. 
As stated above, financial values are the way capitalists simplify the 
qualitatively complex world into commensurable terms. However, 
stand-alone financial values have no meaning in and of themselves. 
While early political economists tried to discern the meaning of 
financial quantities according to the perceived underlying real 
quantities, Nitzan and Bichler emphasize the relational meaning 
between financial quantities. Namely, accumulation is not meaningful 
in absolute terms by reducing nominal quantities to real ones, but 
rather in differential terms. Capitalists care less about an absolute gain 
than “beating the average.”  
If a company’s share value grows by 10 percent, while its sectoral 
competitors grow by 15 percent that is a differential decline. 
Conversely, if the company endures a 5 percent drop in value, but its 
competitors drop by 7 percent, they achieve a differential gain. 
Capitalists assess their successes and failures not against any absolute 
register, but against continually changing benchmarks that average 
across segments and subsegments of the corporate world. This insight 
into the differential nature of accumulation should be uncontroversial, 
as benchmark comparison is commonplace in popular business 
writings and familiar to most people who engage with political 
economic issues.  
Nitzan and Bichler’s (2009) central theoretical claim is that the 
differential measure of capitalization is an expression of the relative 
power of capitalists, and differential accumulation charts the 
redistribution of that power. Again, this is the capitalists’ own 
understanding of the power of themselves and their brethren. 
Capitalization occurs via market participants’ translation of the world 
as it bears on what Nitzan and Bichler refer to as the “elementary 
particles” of capitalization: expected profits, hype, risk and the normal 
rate of return. Differential accumulation occurs when the assessment 
favors one asset over another. Rising oil prices may mean greater 
profits for Exxon, but higher transportation costs for Wal-Mart. 
Increased royalties on copper in Chile would be bad for transnational 
mining company Freeport-McMoRan, but of little consequence to 
Coca-Cola. Unrest in Cameroon might mean higher cocoa costs for the 
Hershey Company, but new defense contracts for BAE Systems.  
As noted above, Nitzan and Bichler have defined power as 
“confidence in obedience.” Resonant with a Machiavellian conception 
of power, capitalist power exists as potential rather than in action. A 
government is powerful when its populace is pliant, not when it must 
deploy the army to quell unrest. A corporation is powerful when all 
that bears on its earnings unfolds predictably. That means the power of 
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capitalists exists in their control over diverse parts of the broad social 
order, including but not limited to, labor. Accumulation occurs when 
they can either increase the confidence of market participants that 
those parts will behave according to expectations, or when more of the 
social order is rendered obedient. While the word obedience connotes 
human–human relations, insights from ANT and STS mean things 
have to be included in our understanding of obedience, corporate 
power and accumulation.  
Things and the Growth of Capital ized Enti t ies 
Although machines have played an important role in political 
economic theory since Adam Smith, they have been rendered by the 
theorists into what Bruno Latour (2005) calls “intermediaries”. 
I n t e r m e d i a r i e s “ t r a n s m i t m e a n i n g o r f o r c e w i t h o u t 
transformation” (39). According to Marxist and neoclassical value 
theory, machines provide a relay for the flow of value from labor to 
capitalists and/or consumers, but they are given no difference-making 
capacity of their own. This is a feature of the dual quantity perspective 
of both Marxist and mainstream value theory: visible quantities 
represent hidden quantities. Within these theories, the passage of “real” 
quanta through the qualitative world to become nominal quanta 
distorts them but leaves them fundamentally unchanged. While 
theorists acknowledge that machines perform a qualitative 
transformation on the materials that pass through them, they do not 
allow for machines to contribute quantitative meaning. According to 
the labor theory of value, machines serve as a repository for 
accumulated surplus-value that originates in labor, but are inert, hence 
their status as “dead labour.” For the hedonistic conception of value of 
neoclassical theory, the machines are simply the means to satisfy the 
quantified desire of homo oeconomicus: individual utility-
maximization.  
Trevor Pinch (2008) observes, “the Marxist analysis neglects the 
enabling aspects of materiality and technology” (463). The capacities 
of equipped labor cannot be reduced to either the labor or the 
equipment. Instead, they emerge from the hybrid. Latour and others 
have advocated for things as the “missing masses” of the social 
sciences (Latour 2008). Rather than intermediaries, things must be 
considered “mediators,” which “transform, translate, distort, and 
modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to 
carry” (2005: 39). Mediators have affect.  
Things are essential for our complex social orders. Things make it 
possible to stabilize distant human relations, which cannot be achieved 
when bodies constitute our only materials (Strum and Latour 1987). 
That stabilization is essential for the expansion that has been an 
important feature of human institutions. In one of the original works 
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of actor–network theory, John Law (1986) called attention to the role 
of things in long-distance navigation and empire-making. European 
navigational knowledge and colonial mindset meant nothing without 
objects to consolidate, standardize and spread that knowledge and 
actualize colonial practices. The possibilities of empire only existed 
because of human-thing assemblages that can transcend the limits of 
pure human-human sociality. Law identified three classes of 
“emissaries” necessary to the task of long-distance control: documents, 
devices and drilled people. They made it possible for those at the 
center to monitor and regulate activities at the periphery. This role of 
things in stabilization makes apparent their indispensable role in 
accumulation. 
Alex Preda (1999) describes a conjunction between Foucault and 
Latour, which links the agglomeration of objects to power, arguing 
that “the larger the network with its objects, the stronger its force will 
be, and hence its authority, legitimacy, and power” (358). However, the 
linear equation of power with size overlooks the fact that expansion 
can also weaken entities, as many mergers and failed product releases 
have demonstrated. Indeed, one could point to the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster as evidence of just such a weakness. Had BP been smaller, 
perhaps it would not have subcontracted the drilling operation. 
Perhaps this particular well would have been better known and 
understood by the executives at the head of the company. Perhaps 
those monitoring the operation would have been the owners whose 
financial stake was directly tied to the well. Instead, absentee owners 
were left to respond after the fact, translating the disaster as a 
revelation of weakness. That is precisely the CasP interpretation of BP 
losing half of its value in the wake of the disaster: the company had 
become weaker.  
The relationship between adding things and gaining power is 
complicated, which is one of the reasons nominal financial values 
cannot be reduced to “real” material quantities. Knowing that a 
corporation is adding things to itself is not enough to know its value 
will increase. Instead, additions are assessed within multiple affective 
contexts, such as current consumer trends, the pace of technological 
advance, and an innovation’s degree of discontinuity. The corporations 
with the most employees and the most machines are not the most 
highly valued. Apple, for example, has demonstrated that a smaller 
customer base, but highly loyal to a restricted stable of products is of 
higher value than a more diffused product line. From the CasP 
conception, only expansion that translates into greater expected 
earnings or reduced risk, and thereby increases capitalized value, is 
interpreted as an increase in power.  
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Equipment, Exper t ise and Exper ience 
Objects can be considered more obedient when the relations they 
mediate become more stable. This can occur through greater 
knowledge that is distributed between the object and its operator 
(Hutchins 1995). The knowledge of the drilling workers was 
comprised of equipment, expertise and experience. All three are 
required to identify a “kick”—the unwanted intrusion of 
hydrocarbons into the wellbore. With the kick identified, an 
appropriate response can be formulated. Kicks are not uncommon 
events and workers quell the vast majority. Identifying the kick 
depends on reliable equipment that translates signals from the well, 
expertise about oil formations and drilling operations, and an 
experienced operator who develops intuitions combining the 
equipment and expertise. The operator can then trigger responsive 
actions that are relayed through a series of worker-object assemblages 
to quell the kick. Past experiences become standardized knowledge 
that gets passed on through textbooks and manuals. An expert 
operator is one who embodies the industry knowledge, one who 
utilizes the signals from monitoring equipment to recognize that a kick 
is occurring and enacts established protocols. 
Preda draws on Latour’s network conception of power and connects 
it to Foucault’s insights on the relationship between power and 
knowledge. As Foucault (1980) argued, power can be increased by 
augmenting and improving knowledge of the entities under one’s 
control, including things. Preda argues that things are essential 
participants in the development of knowledge and the performance of 
control. He remarks that while explanations for the social order 
should include artifacts, they should also consider the “strategies and 
resources through which human actors manage to account for a social 
order in which they take themselves as different with respect to the 
artifacts to which they are related” (Preda 1999: 361). In other words, 
not only are things an essential component of confidence in obedience, 
so too is their exclusion from our understanding of the social order. 
Things play an important role in the transfer of power that is 
expressed in accumulation. An alternative to equipped, expert, 
experienced operators are mechanisms devised to internalize a task, 
incorporating the industry’s knowledge and the operator’s skill into an 
automated response. Skilled operators, when they perform according 
to expectations, are—from the perspective of a company’s owners—
intermediaries. Unfortunately for the owners, workers have a history 
and a habit of disobedience, becoming indeterminate, unpredictable 
mediators who defy the calculative expectations of market 
participants. Workers pose a constant threat of work withdrawal and 
more. While collective bargaining agreements and other negotiating 
mechanisms have made strikes more predictable and financially 
manageable, worker agency remains much more uncertain than that of 
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things. Hence, the history of technological development in the 
twentieth century is marked by automation as skill internalization, 
substituting relatively obedient machines for relatively disobedient 
workers (Noble 1984; Braverman 1998).  
The relative obedience of machines contributes to making them 
calculable. As Callon (1998a) writes, “if calculations are to be 
performed and completed, the agents and goods involved in these 
calculations must be disentangled and framed” (16). The operating 
parameters of machines are well known. They break down at 
predictable intervals that typically occur as a function of the pace of 
operation. This means optimal levels of output can be calculated, 
making profit levels more certain. This can then be translated in the 
capitalization formula into a lower risk factor. Conversely, things can 
disobey in an unpredictable, contingent manner. When that occurs, an 
operator’s agency is required; they must be mediators. In such an 
event, the worker must transcend their skills, combining knowledge 
and equipment in a new way to create an emergent procedure. Things 
provide the means to predictable, stable functioning. But humans are 
needed to restabilize a system that deviates in an unpredictable way. 
That said, restabilization will also require things with unwavering 
stability that cannot be matched by even the most heroic of humans.  
It was the Macondo well’s disobedience that triggered the enormous 
loss of BP’s power. Human ingenuity enlisted things to perform in 
unprecedented ways to finally stop the leak. As seen in Figure 1, 
reports of the impending capping drove up the capitalization of BP. 
Market participants assessed greater power via the human-object 
assemblage responsible for stopping the leak. All the ingenuity in the 
world would have been useless without the things. The stabilization of 
the company’s new relative valuation required numerous things whose 
behavior was calculable for the fact of being stable and predictable. 
Those calculations will black box the vast majority of BP’s operations, 
with both humans and things inside, operating together in ways that 
are irreducible, but measurable (Latour 1993a). Typically, those boxes 
will remain closed as predictable, obedient entities unless there is an 
event that defies the calculations, as occurred with the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster. 
Going Deeper through the Blowout Preventer 
The title of chapter 2 of the National Commission’s Report to the 
President (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011) comes from a quote by an oil 
industry consultant uttered in 1970: “Each oil well has its own 
personality” (28). Knowledge of past wells can only partly inform 
engagement with present wells. Each well can be considered a subject, 
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according to the simple definition offered by Peter Sloterdijk (2013): 
unpredictability (58). Oil-bearing formations have to be studied to get 
a sense of what the well might be like. As the well is drilled, it is 
constantly monitored to understand its unique characteristics. The 
deeper is the well, the more unpredictable it will be. The task of 
drilling operations is to tame these unruly subjects. From the 
perspective of ownership, these operations are largely black boxed. 
Yet, within the black box, the drilling grapples with the subjectivity to 
increase confidence in the obedience of the well.  
One of the most important pieces of equipment for taming a well is 
the BoP. The BoP serves several functions of well control. However, the 
most vital function is to kill a well in the event of an emergency, such 
as an uncontrollable kick. The mechanism of last resort is the morbidly 
named dead man’s switch, which activates rams to seal off the well if 
the BoP loses contact with the surface. During the unfolding 
Deepwater Horizon disaster, the dead man mechanism failed to 
perform as expected. The reasons continue to be subject to dispute.  
The BoP was invented in 1922 and made commercially available in 
1924. Before the use of the BoP, wells were allowed to blow out until 
the subsurface pressure was reduced enough to allow capping. This led 
to the iconic scenes of thick, black oil gushing forcefully out the top of 
a drilling rig. The practice was dangerous, environmentally damaging 
and financially wasteful. The BoP made it possible to control the 
pressure differential and became a universal mechanism of oil 
exploration and extraction. Although the BoP continues to evolve, 
growing capable of handling higher and higher well pressures, its vital 
role is unchanged. As such, it is a stable—black boxed—part of the 
capitalization of firms involved in the oil industry.  
Thomas Hughes (1993) identifies technological systems as a 
combination of technical, political and economic factors. It is the total 
combination that gets priced by capitalization. When something goes 
wrong and recalculations need to be made, the combination gets 
opened and parts identified for more precise recalculation. Those parts 
have to be situated within their technical trajectories, but also political 
and economic trajectories in order to perform such recalculations. 
Within the CasP framework, these examinations and resultant 
recalculations constitute a reassessment of power. The volatility of the 
price of BP during the disaster evidences the confusion about the 
make-up of the company’s power. Some of the reassessment was an 
examination of the BoP, and its position within the broader assemblage 
of equipment, experience and expertise. 
Was the failure of the BoP on the Macondo well because of material 
shortcomings? If so, were these material shortcomings because it was 
poorly formulated by its producer or because it was mishandled by its 
user? Was such mishandling due to cost cutting measures by the well 
owner and/or drill operator, or was it due to the faulty practices of 
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well workers? Might government regulations regarding BoP operation 
be revisited and changed in response? Might BoP installation and 
monitoring practices be changed? Might the structure of BoPs be 
changed? Each question opens up further questions, all of which have 
financial, and therefore accumulatory consequences. As well, each 
question has material indeterminacy built in. How might the BoP 
respond to these changes? What will be required to “tame” it and 
ensure the necessary compliance that will make its use predictable and 
therefore calculable? What will be the future political-economic-
technological trajectory of BoPs? What will be the financial 
consequences? How will this impact the control of BP and other oil 
and oil services companies? 
Early suspicions, confirmed by subsequent investigation, held that 
the problem of the Deepwater Horizon’s BoP was unique rather than 
endemic. This suspicion, along with the expectation that the disaster 
would not result in widespread, costly changes in deep-water oil 
exploration practices, is likely the reason the differential decline of 
other Gulf exploring oil companies was relatively short-lived. By the 
end of 2010, these companies would be beating the S&P 500.  
As part of the Deepwater Horizon drilling assemblage, the 
operation of the BoP—or one channel of its operation—took for 
granted an experienced, equipped expert who could recognize failures 
within the drilling assemblage and trigger the various rams capable of 
closing off the well. On the one hand, should everything go as planned, 
then the worker’s actions will be black boxed as unfolding in 
accordance with established and expected routines. Owners can have 
confidence in the obedience of the entire assemblage. On the other 
hand, in expectation that the workers’ actions may be disrupted, there 
are redundancies built into the system that are supposed to 
automatically trigger the BoP. However, these systems assume some 
prior work by others within the assemblage that are translated into 
material mechanisms, such as the dual battery systems that are 
supposed to drive the blind shear rams in the event that 
communication with the rig is lost. In the case of the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster, these batteries had not been properly installed or 
maintained.  
There are multiple lines along which failures occur, including the 
regulatory line. There was no oversight to ensure that these batteries, 
and the systems they were to power, were functioning properly. 
Another line passes through the workers who were blamed for the 
error, but we could follow the line further and possibly find problems 
with their training or with training manuals. Was there a limit to their 
expertise that could be addressed? Perhaps the disaster exposed a gap 
in the experience of the crew, despite their collective years of operating 
drilling rigs. Might another crew have recognized the problem before it 
 Valuation Studies 28
became a disaster? The investigation of the disaster constituted a long 
line of opening black boxes and the quantifications of some market 
participants would have followed along trying to translate the findings 
into capitalized values.  
Conclusion 
The neglect of objects from our accounts of social asymmetries is itself 
a mechanism of power. The more we overlook the irreducible role of 
equipment in the emergence of tactics used to order society the easier it 
is to develop and deploy such mechanisms of control. The dominant 
theories of value leave no place for things as mediators. According to 
these theories, objects are either intermediaries for the satisfaction of 
desire or stores of dead labor. I argue that Nitzan and Bichler’s (2009) 
power theory of value, which conceptualizes differential capitalization 
as an expression of power, makes it possible to understand things as 
dynamic participants in the constant evolution of the qualities of 
capitalism. The construction of values is an ongoing recalculative 
assessment that closes and opens black boxes, inside of which are 
assemblages of worker-objects quantified through a variety of 
measures, but passing into the quantities of finance, culminating in 
capitalization. Capitalization is an ongoing epistemological reduction 
while accumulation is vitally connected to ontological irreducibility. 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster unfolded as a complex, 
indeterminate event that market participants translated into uncertain 
valuations of BP and other capitalized entities. The capital value 
assigned to the company fluctuated wildly as it trended downward. 
The repricing occurred as black boxes were opened. First, market 
participants had to make qualitative sense of the contents, including 
such objects as BoPs, nitrogen-rich cement, float-shoes, blind-shear 
rams and hydrocarbons. Then, all this qualitative diversity had to be 
translated into the commensurable units of finance.  
Financial markets have a single-minded purpose: evaluation. That 
evaluation is based on a remarkably simple criterion: discounted 
expected profits. However, the actual process of evaluation, one that 
tries to bring the future into the present, is incredibly complex. It 
draws information into and along what Latour and Lepinay (2010) 
call “metrological chains.” Out the other end, via the process of buying 
and selling shares, a single number emerges. That number gets folded 
back into the calculations, which are without end. The incredible 
complexity makes it difficult to identify (1) what is being accounted 
for; (2) how anything is being evaluated; or (3) when new entities and 
processes get counted. Much of what counts is black boxed because 
market participants are confident in the obedience of what is inside. 
However, moments of crisis, such as the Deepwater Horizon disaster, 
can offer a window into the struggle of evaluation, as black boxes are 
thrown open and entities must be re-evaluated. The CasP method 
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offers a means of identifying the market’s efforts to make sense of the 
world remade by the crisis. 
Sociologists of finance are concerned with price formation, while 
the meaning and affect of prices have remained outside their analyses. 
In the analysis above, I noted the lack of information about the 
process by which social qualities are translated into the quantities of 
finance. This suggests the need for research that moves among these 
three domains: values, evaluation and evaluated.  
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